What Did Netanyahu Know Before October 7?
Ten days before October 7, 2023, the president of the United Arab Emirates picked up the phone and spent 45 minutes warning Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas was about to move. Weeks earlier, Yahya Sinwar himself had already used one word to describe what was coming: zilzal, earthquake.
New reporting connected to a forthcoming book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval now traces that warning back through multiple channels and asks a harder question: what did Netanyahu actually do with it, and with every warning that came before it.
Their investigation alleges that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed personally warned Netanyahu roughly 10 days before October 7 that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major Hamas op*ration. An Emirati source familiar with the conversation has reportedly corroborated the account. Netanyahu categorically denies that the warning call occurred and has described the story as an “absolute lie.”
The warning allegedly began with Yahya Sinwar
According to the investigation, the warning chain may have begun with Sinwar himself.
Sinwar allegedly communicated through a Fatah-linked intermediary known by the pseudonym “Coal Eyes.” He reportedly used zilzal, Arabic for “earthquake,” and referred to the “mother of all surprises.”
The message reportedly reached Shin Bet on September 15, 2023. Then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar allegedly briefed Netanyahu, while senior security officials subsequently discussed the growing threat.
If accurate, this would mean the alleged warning was not merely foreign intelligence arriving from outside Isr*el. It had reportedly entered Isr*el’s own security system.
Mohammed bin Zayed allegedly warned Netanyahu directly
The investigation’s most politically explosive allegation concerns UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed.
Approximately 10 days before the op*ration, MBZ allegedly spoke directly with Netanyahu and warned him that Sinwar was preparing a major Hamas op*ration.
Netanyahu reportedly responded that Isr*el was prepared for different scenarios.
The UAE has neither publicly confirmed nor denied the specific conversation, saying it does not comment on private communications between leaders. An Emirati source, however, has reportedly corroborated that the warning occurred.
Netanyahu says it did not.
The UAE was allegedly not the only warning channel
The alleged UAE warning exists alongside other reports concerning intelligence before October 7.
Egypt had separately been reported to have warned Isr*el that something significant could happen. U.S. intelligence assessments also reportedly detected the possibility of escalating Hamas activity and cross-border att*cks before October 7.
These warnings were not necessarily equal in specificity. Evidence does not establish that every source knew the exact date, scale or operational details of the att*ck.
But their cumulative existence raises a different question: how many warning signs reached Isr*el’s political and security leadership before October 7?
Secret negotiations were happening at the same time
Another part of the reported chronology concerns indirect negotiations between Hamas and Isr*el before October 7.
The discussions reportedly involved Palestinian prisoners, Israelis held in Gaza, easing restrictions and economic arrangements.
Netanyahu allegedly delayed moving the negotiations forward. Sinwar then reportedly disappeared from the negotiating channel before warnings about a major op*ration intensified.
The sequence has fuelled arguments that the stalled negotiations influenced what happened next.
That causal connection has not been established. An op*ration on the scale of October 7 required substantial advance planning, meaning chronology alone cannot demonstrate why Sinwar proceeded with it.
Was an early hostage-release proposal rejected?
Of everything in this chronology, this is the thread getting the least attention, despite raising the most immediate question about decisions made after the att*ck already began.
The controversy continues into the days immediately following October 7. Former Hostages Families Forum spokesman Haim Rubinstein later alleged that Hamas offered around October 9–10 to release all civilian hostages if Isr*el did not enter Gaza, and that the government rejected the proposal.
That allegation should not be confused with the more dramatic claim circulating online that Hamas offered to release every civilian hostage on October 7 itself and Netanyahu rejected the offer while the att*ck was unfolding.
The latter version remains unverified.
What the allegation does raise is another question about the government’s decisions during the first days after October 7 and whether opportunities to secure civilian hostages were available.
Intelligence failure or something darker?
The allegations surrounding Netanyahu now extend far beyond ordinary intelligence failure.
Critics connect three elements: warnings that reportedly reached Netanyahu, negotiations that stalled before October 7, and a prime minister already fighting for his political survival.
From there, some have alleged something considerably darker: that Netanyahu knew enough to deliberately allow October 7 to happen, wanted the att*ck to occur, or subsequently benefited politically from the w*r.
Those allegations of deliberate intent remain unproven.
Evidence of warnings can support questions about forewarning, negligence and responsibility. It does not automatically establish knowledge of the precise att*ck or prove a deliberate decision to allow it.
But the accumulating warning claims make the question of responsibility increasingly difficult to avoid.
Netanyahu says the warning never happened
Netanyahu’s response to the central allegation is categorical.
His office says checks of relevant records found no evidence that the alleged UAE warning call occurred. Netanyahu has accused the journalists behind the story of publishing false information and has moved toward legal action.
The journalists stand by their investigation.
The UAE has stopped short of denying the alleged conversation.
An Emirati source has reportedly corroborated it.
Former prime minister Naftali Bennett has publicly said the report is true, while Gadi Eisenkot has separately accused Netanyahu of ignoring repeated warnings before October 7.
Nearly three years later, the argument is therefore moving beyond the question of who failed on October 7.
It is increasingly about what Isr*el’s leadership knew before it happened.
And the central question remains:
What did Netanyahu know, when did he know it, and what did he do with the warnings?
By Verity Quill
Sources
1. Haaretz, “Revealed: Netanyahu Received an Explicit Warning Days Before Oct. 7. He Didn’t Brief Israel’s Security Chiefs” — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-09-08/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/netanyahu-got-an-explicit-warning-before-oct-7-he-didnt-brief-security-chiefs/000001a0-7a3b-d7d5-a9fc-7eff3d0f0000
2. The Times of Israel, “Days before Oct. 7, UAE leader warned Netanyahu Hamas was planning war” — https://www.timesofisrael.com/days-before-oct-7-uae-leader-warned-netanyahu-hamas-was-planning-war-but-pm-did-nothing-with-the-info-report/
3. CNN interview and reporting concerning Shlomi Eldar’s investigation — not located in this research pass. No verifiable link found. Either supply the specific segment or pull this line before publish.
4. The Times of Israel, “Netanyahu says he’ll sue Haaretz over report UAE leader warned him days before Oct. 7” — https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-hell-sue-haaretz-over-report-uae-leader-warned-him-days-before-oct-7/
5. The Jerusalem Post, on Bennett’s response — https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-907896
This piece covers Bennett directly; the specific Eisenkot quote could not be independently confirmed in this pass.
6. Egypt warning — Ynet, “Why did Israel ignore Egypt’s warnings ahead of October 7?” — https://ynetnews.com/article/bylsctbjkg
U.S. intelligence assessments specifically: no source located in this pass.
7. Haim Rubinstein’s hostage-release allegation — not independently verified in this pass. Needs its own primary-source link before this runs.
Additional corroboration located but not yet folded into the numbered list:
—. France 24 — https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260908-uae-leader-warned-netanyahu-of-hamas-attack-days-before-october-7-says-report
—. Middle East Eye — https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-president-warned-netanyahu-major-hamas-operation-ahead-7-october
